We provide the first estimates of the effects of minimum wages on employment flows in the US labor market, identifying the impact by using policy discontinuities at state borders. We find that minimum wages have a sizable negative effect on employment flows but not on stocks. Separations and accessions fall among affected workers, especially those with low tenure. We do not find changes in the duration of nonemployment for separations or hires. This evidence is consistent with search models with endogenous separations.
data set-the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI)-to estimate the minimum wage elasticities of average earnings, employment stocks, and employment flows. The QWI data permit us to estimate the responses of local labor market accession, separation, and turnover rates for two highimpact demographic and industry groups: teens and restaurant workers. To our knowledge, these are the first estimates of the effects of minimum wage increases on employment flows using nationally representative US data. Our estimated elasticities utilize a border-discontinuity design that eliminates biases from spatial heterogeneity present in many previous minimum wage studies (Allegretto et al. 2013) .
We begin by showing that minimum wages have sizable effects on earnings on the two most affected groups: a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises average weekly earnings by 2.2% for teens and 2.1% for restaurant workers. We find striking evidence that separations, hires, and turnover rates for teens and restaurant workers fall substantially following a minimum wage increase-with most of the reductions coming within the first 3 quarters of the higher minimum. For a 10% minimum wage increase, turnover rates decline by around 2.0% for teens and 2.1% for the restaurant workforce. In contrast to our results on employment flows, the impact of minimum wage increases on the employment stock is small: for both teens and restaurant workers, our estimated employment elasticities are small in magnitude and are not statistically distinguishable from zero. In addition, while workers remain at their jobs longer, that does not appear to be true for time spent between jobs. We do not detect changes in the average duration of nonemployment spells for those transitioning in and out of jobs (with the caveat that this variable is measured somewhat coarsely). Finally, for the restaurant workforce, we also do not find any evidence of substantial laborlabor substitution with respect to age or gender.
Our finding of reduced employment flows is consistent with models of the labor market with search frictions and endogenous separations that take the form either of transitions to other jobs ("quits") or to nonemployment ("layoffs"). One explanation of reduced flows comes from a job ladder model, in which minimum wages reduce job-to-job transitions by lowering the arrival rate of better-paying job offers. We show analytically that in a broad class of job ladder models, a minimum wage increase affects employment flows relatively more than stocks when there is greater equilibrium dispersion in job-to-job transition rates. Such dispersion stems from frictional wage inequality. In appendix A (appendices A-D are available online), we show that a calibrated job ladder model predicts relatively larger elasticities for employment flows than for stocks, which is consistent with our evidence.
An alternative explanation suggests that higher minimum wages reduce transitions to nonemployment, possibly through reduced layoffs. However, both the canonical Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model with endogenous separations and the variant in Pissarides (2000) that incorporates uncertainty about match quality generate predictions that higher minimum wages should increase layoffs since fewer matches are profitable. This reduced profitability of matches would lead to a higher equilibrium separation rate, contradicting the evidence. Recently Brochu and Green (2013) have extended the match quality model by adding the condition that match quality is realized after an initial probationary period and (importantly) that the costs of posting a vacancy are heterogeneous. In this model, a minimum wage increase reduces an employer's willingness to lay off workers with lower match values and then search anew. A higher minimum wage raises the costs to hiring a new recruit during the probationary period, thereby reducing the value of the termination option for a current employee. Put differently, search has sunk costs that increase with the minimum wage.
Since most workers who are laid off enter nonemployment, the BrochuGreen match quality model implies that minimum wages reduce employment-to-unemployment (EU) transitions. This prediction contrasts with the job ladder model, which suggests that the reduction in flows takes the form of reduced employment-to-employment (EE) transitions, that is, job quits. Unfortunately, the QWI data set does not allow us to directly measure EE versus EU transitions. However, the consistency between the predictions of the job ladder model calibrated using crosssectional flows and the empirical findings on the relative magnitudes of the employment and separations elasticities provide evidence supporting the job ladder model. At the same time, the biggest reduction in separation occurs in low-tenure jobs, suggesting that the match quality effect may be important as well.
Our paper relates to four distinct literatures. First, a handful of papers have directly estimated the reduced-form effects of minimum wages on equilibrium turnover, separations, or tenure. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) find that teen separations in continuing firms fall substantially after a youth-specific minimum wage increase in Portugal. Since the share of teens hired in new firms also falls, overall teen employment does not change substantially. Portugal and Cardoso find that the teen share of separations fell by about 15% in response to a 50% increase in the minimum wage-an implicit separations elasticity of 20.3. These findings are similar to ours: we estimate a separations elasticity of 20.23 for teens. However, since their estimation relies on a national-level policy change, Portugal and Cardoso's paper is more like a single-case study, raising concerns about both the identification strategy and inference that are not issues for us. In particular, since Portugal and Cardoso's primary control group consists of all adults in the country, any age-specific shocks affecting the national labor market could confound their estimates. In contrast, we are able to use 196 different minimum wage changes with geographically proximate control groups to account for a rich array of heterogeneous trends. Additionally, we provide further evidence on the channels by explicitly showing the implications of a general job ladder model, which subsumes the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model that Portugal and Cardoso invoke to explain their results.
In a paper written concurrently with ours, Brochu and Green (2013) use Canadian data and find that hires, quits, and layoffs of low-skilled teens decline in the year after a minimum wage increase. They find that layoffs account for a larger proportion of the reduction, although the magnitudes depend on how quits are defined. Most relevant to our paper, they find an overall separation elasticity of between 20.27 and 20.35 for teens, which is similar to what we find here (20.23). Like us, Brochu and Green also find that the reduction in separations is concentrated among lower-tenure workers. With a more inclusive definition of quits that uses job-to-job transitions, they find that quits can explain close to 40% of this reduction.
Brochu and Green differ from us in finding a more negative impact on employment of low-skilled teens, with an elasticity of 20.25. (However, for low-skilled adults, they find reductions in separations but not employment.) Unfortunately, the small number of Canadian provinces (and hence policy clusters) raises concerns about their identification and inference. For example, Brochu and Green's empirical strategy cannot rule out that heterogeneous spatial trends are driving some of their findings on layoffs and employment-trends that we show are quite important in the US context. For example, our estimates, when uncorrected for spatial heterogeneity, produce teen disemployment estimates similar to theirs, but we show that such estimates are driven by confounders. Additionally, we use administrative data on separations from the near universe of employers, which substantially reduces measurement error problems that arise in selfreported data from the household surveys used by Brochu and Green. Overall, however, we regard our findings on employment flows as quite complementary with the limited international evidence: minimum wages tend to have much larger impacts on employment flows than on employment levels.
A few studies examine the effects of wage mandates on labor market flows in much more limited contexts. Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) estimate employment and tenure effects in a single city-San Francisco-in response to a citywide wage mandate. The effects of "living-wage" laws on firm-based employee turnover have been studied in specific cities and sectors-for example, Fairris (2005) for local government service contractors in Los Angeles, Howes (2005) for homecare workers in selected California counties, and Reich, Hall, and Jacobs (2005) for employers in the San Francisco International Airport.
1 Overall, compared to these papers, we are able to estimate the responses of employment flows to minimum wage changes using much richer variation and a more credible identification strategy.
Second, our paper relates to firm-level estimates of labor supply elasticities and monopsony power. Manning (2003 Manning ( , 2010 discusses the importance of perfect competition in the labor market. Card and Krueger (1995) propose a dynamic monopsony model, in which separation and recruitment rates are functions of the wage. They argue that empirically plausible magnitudes of the labor supply elasticities facing a firm are consistent with small positive or zero effects of a minimum wage increase on employment levels. Subsequent firm-level studies, such as those surveyed by Ashenfelter, Farber, and Ransom (2010) , have indeed found small firmlevel separations elasticities (and hence labor supply elasticities), consistent with substantial wage-setting power. However, it is difficult to use these firm-level labor supply elasticities to deduce market-wide changes from an increase in the minimum wage. We build on this literature by showing how equilibrium flows respond to a minimum wage shock and what this result, together with our estimates of these flows, tells us about the extent and nature of search frictions in the labor market.
Third, a number of papers use structurally estimated search models to study minimum wage effects. These papers include Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1999, 2000) , Flinn (2006) , and Flinn and Mabli (2009). 2 These authors primarily use cross-sectional hazard rates and the wage distribution to estimate model parameters and then simulate the effect of a minimum wage policy. In contrast, we estimate the reduced-form effects of minimum wages on employment stocks and flows using exogenous policy variation and compare our estimates with the predictions from alternative models. The comparison of our estimates to the predictions from a calibrated job ladder model constitutes a test of overidentifying restrictions, thereby providing new evidence on the model's ability to fit the data. We find that the job ladder model can fit some, but not all, of the moments estimated using minimum wage variation.
Fourth, we make both substantive and methodological contributions to the literature on minimum wage effects on employment rates. Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) used a cross-border design to estimate the impact of minimum wages on restaurant employment. Here we use a similar border discontinuity approach to additionally study teens-the most commonly studied group in the literature. This approach constitutes a substantial improvement upon our previous estimates for teens, which used the Current Population Survey data and coarser spatial controls (Allegretto, Dube, and Reich 2011) . Methodologically, we provide additional support for the border discontinuity design by directly showing that cross-border contiguous counties are substantially more similar in levels and trends of covariates than counties farther away. 3 We find that even among border county pairs, counties with more proximate centroids are more similar to each other, as measured by covariates. For this reason, we implement a further refinement by limiting attention to county pairs whose centroids are within 75 kilometers of each other. As we describe in appendix B (available online), this threshold is selected by a randomization inference procedure using placebo laws that seeks to minimize the mean squared error of the estimator.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we discuss alternative channels through which minimum wages can affect separations. We present our identification strategy, dataset and sample in Section III and report our empirical findings in Section IV. Section V evaluates alternative theoretical channels in light of the empirical evidence and quantifies the likely importance of job-to-job and employment-to-nonemployment transitions in explaining the results. We present our conclusions in Section V.
II. Minimum Wage and Separations: Alternative Channels
Since search models examine how worker-firm matches are created and dissolved, they provide a natural framework for understanding the impact of policies on separations. For separations to occur endogenously, a search model needs the match value or the outside options available to workers or firms to vary over time. Two popular classes of models have such endogenous separations. The first is the job ladder model, in which workers search both on and off the job. Here the arrival of a superior offer affects a worker's willingness to stay at his or her current job; therefore, changes in the offer wage distribution can affect the steady state rate at which workers leave their jobs to take better ones. In the second type of model, match quality is uncertain. Over time, as more information about the match value is revealed, employers and workers decide whether to stay in their current match or to dissolve the match and search anew. Since the job ladder model predicts a reduction in quits in response to a higher minimum wage, it predicts a lower rate of job-to-job (EE) transitions. In contrast, in the match quality model, reduced layoffs lead to lower rates of job-to-unemployment (EU) transitions. In this section. we discuss these two classes of models in greater detail. Since Brochu and Green (2013) extensively analyze the match quality case, in this paper ,we devote more attention to the job ladder case and its implications.
In the job ladder model, workers search both on and off the job, with possibly different search efficiencies: offers arrive at a rate l to the unemployed and l e ¼ fl to the employed, where f is an exogenous parameter capturing the relative efficiency of on-the-job search. Workers move if they receive a higher wage than at their current job, w. If they are unemployed, they accept a job if it pays above the reservation wage, b, assumed to be below a binding minimum wage, w: Given an offer wage distribution F(w), this occurs at the rate l e ½1 2 FðwÞ. In addition, exogenous job destructions occur at the rate j. Therefore, the total separation rate at a job equals the sum of the exogenous job destruction rate j and the rate at which workers leave to take better-paying jobs, l e ½1 2 FðwÞ. This latter term, reflecting EE transitions, constitutes the channel through which a policy such as the minimum wage affects the separation rate. See Nagypal (2005) for additional discussion of the job ladder model.
In appendix A, we show that in any job ladder model, the ratio of the elasticities of the mean separations and employment rates with respect to the minimum wage can be written as a function of equlibrium unemployment, mean separations and offer arrival rates:
The numerator in equation (1) is the equilibrium unemployment rate, u. The denominator equals the difference between (i) the job-to-job share of separations for workers earning the lowest wage, fl/(j + fl), and (ii) the job-to-job share of separations for the workforce as a whole, E[(s 2 j)]/E(s).
The difference between these two shares will be greater precisely when there is more frictional wage inequality, that is, when workers at the lowest wage jobs are less likely to stay at their jobs as compared to the workforce as a whole. 4 Overall, the ratio of the employment and the separation rate elasticities will be small in magnitude when the initial unemployment rate is low as compared to the dispersion in job-to-job transitions (which in turn reflects frictional wage inequality). This is a novel result-the relative magnitudes of the employment stock and flow elasticities is a function only of the equilibrium offer arrival rate l, the job destruction rate j, and the relative efficiency of on-the-job search, f.
The determination of the equilibrium offer arrival and unemployment rates depend on the specific features of the model. In appendix A, we use the wage posting model of Bontemps et al. (1999 Bontemps et al. ( , 2000 as an illustration and express the ratio of the two elasticities in equation (1) as a function of the primitives of the model. However, we stress that equation (1) holds for the broad class of job ladder models regardless of the details regarding wage setting and entry. This result is useful because it suggests that the effects of a minimum wage policy change on the relative magnitudes of the employment stock and flow elasticities depend only on parameters that can all be calibrated using cross-sectional flows. In appendix A, we also provide a calibration of the job ladder model using cross-sectional employment flows from the Current Population Survey (see appendix table A1). Our calibration predicts a minimum wage elasticity of employment that is less than half (45%) as large as the separation elasticity when using the teen employment flows and one-fourth (25%) as large when using cross-sectional flows from the restaurant workforce. In other words, a calibrated job ladder model predicts that minimum wages have a much larger effect on gross worker flows than on employment rates. We stress again that these findings apply to a broad class of models with on-the-job search, including the well-known Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps et al. (1999 Bontemps et al. ( , 2000 models with wage posting and the Pissarides (2000) or Flinn and Mabli (2009) models with on-the-job search and bargained wages.
An alternative account focuses on changes in the quality of a match. However, standard models with stochastic match quality, such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) or the Pissarides (2000, chap. 2) extension to uncertain match quality, actually imply the "wrong" prediction on separations. As shown in Pissarides (2000) , when match quality (x) is unknown until the end of the probationary period, the firm's choice of retaining matches has a reservation value property such that only matches x > x* are kept. With a binding minimum wage, it is straightforward to show that x* = w M . This result in turn implies that a rise in the minimum wage deems more matches unprofitable ex post from the firm's perspective-thereby leading to more terminations ("layoffs").
Since the direct effect of a minimum wage increase goes in the "wrong" direction, one needs an indirect effect in the opposite direction to produce a reduction in separations. That may occur through the effect of the policy on the firms' outside option. If a higher minimum wage makes vacancies even less profitable than a marginal match, firms may opt to produce with the existing worker as long as the profits are positive.
To operationalize this logic, Brochu and Green (2013) modify the model by adding heterogeneous vacancy costs faced by employers: potential employers first draw a stochastic vacancy cost prior to posting the vacancy. Once they fill the vacancy, they pay workers the minimum wage during a probationary period. Subsequently they learn the true match value, and they then decide whether to terminate or to continue the match. In this setting, the minimum wage alters the outside option of incumbent employers who have the knowledge of the true match quality: they have already paid the "sunk cost" of discovery. For the marginal incumbent firm, a rise in the minimum wage reduces the asset value of a vacancy as compared to the current match since it would have to repay the (higher) costs of the probationary period. As a result, x* may actually fall with the minimum wage, and employers lay off fewer workers and correspondingly have fewer hires. Of course, the direct effect may dominate, and layoffs could rise, as in Pissarides (2000) . Therefore, whether separations actually fall is ambiguous in the model, and it depends on parameter values. Similarly, the effect on employment rate is also ambiguous, and it depends on the extent to which vacancy creation is diminished. As a corollary, since the employer learning occurs early in the new employment relationship (at the end of the probationary period), the Brochu-Green model predicts that layoffs are tenure-duration dependent.
Both classes of models are consistent with declines in employment flows that substantially exceed changes in employment levels. As our brief comparison of the two models suggests, the effects of minimum wages on separations occurs through different channels in each model. In the job ladder model, quits fall with a higher minimum wage, leading to lower EE rates; in the match quality learning model, layoffs fall, causing the EU rate to fall.
III. Research Design and Data Sources

A. Identification Strategy
Minimum wage policies are not randomly distributed across US states. Allegretto et al. (2013) show that states that were more likely to increase their minimum wage over the past 2 decades were also systematically different in other labor market attributes. They tended to experience greater reductions in routine-task occupations, higher growth in upper-half wage inequality, and sharper economic downturns. And they were highly correlated with Democratic party vote share, which suggests the possibility of other confounding policy changes.
In this paper, we use a border discontinuity design to account for potential confounds, as proposed and implemented in Dube et al. (2010) . This approach, which generalizes Card and Krueger (2000) , exploits minimum wage policy discontinuities at state borders by comparing outcomes from Minimum Wage Shocks, Employment Flows, and Labor Market Frictions 000 all US counties on either side of a state border. 5 As shown in detail in Dube et al. 2010 , this research design has desirable properties for identifying minimum wage effects. Measuring labor market outcomes from an immediately adjacent county provides a better control group since firms and workers on either side are generally affected by the same idiosyncratic local trends and experience macroeconomic shocks at roughly the same time. In Section III.E, we show that contiguous counties are substantially more similar in levels and trends of covariates. The border discontinuity design also offers a way to address concerns about policy endogeneity. Minimum wage policies may react to shocks affecting the whole state, not just those affecting counties right at the border. Therefore, policy differences within cross-border pairs are unlikely to reflect endogeneity concerns that may severely bias studies using state-level variation.
More formally, consider the following data-generating process:
Here y it refers to the dependent variable-which could be the log of earnings, employment, separations, hires, or the turnover rate-in county i, at time t, for each of the specific industry or demographic groups (e.g., restaurant workers or teens). The minimum wage variable lnðMW sðiÞt Þ in a given county i is set at the level of the state, s(i), and b is the primary coefficient of interest. In addition, there is a vector of time-varying controls, X it , which include the natural log of total private sector employment and population in each county.
6
We will estimate equation (2) using a panel of cross-state contiguous county pairs. We note that a given county i can be part of multiple pairs if it has more than one adjacent county j across the state line. The data set stacks observations from counties by each pair formed by i, j. Therefore, each observation is indexed by ijt, where i is the primary county for the observation, j denotes the county to which this replicate of county i is paired with, and t, as before, denotes time. While we use the indexing convention of ijt for relevant variables to clarify that the county pairs nature of the data set, for all original variables z, the values for the same county i are the same 5 Appendix figure C1 provides a map of the border sample that indicates which pairs have some variation in minimum wages. It also identifies the pairs used in our estimation sample, with county centroids no more than 75 kilometers apart.
6 Together these two variables represent a flexible formulation of the employmentto-population ratio, which captures the state of the overall local labor market conditions. The overall private sector population and employment are unlikely to be affected by a policy targeting a small fraction (typically between 5% and 10%) of the private sector workforce. As a result, their inclusion is unlikely to block any legitimate causal pathways. We use county-level Census Bureau population data, which are reported on an annual basis. 000 Dube et al.
irrespective of the county j that they are paired with, that is, (2) is complicated due to heterogeneity across time and place that is not captured by observables, which makes it quite likely that EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ; e it Þ 0. The first, conventional, approach to estimating b in equation (2) includes two-way (county and time) fixed effects as controls to account for such unboserved heterogeneity. A regression with such two-way fixed effects is identical to a regression using demeaned data, a formulation that is useful when comparing it with our preferred border discontinuity design. For any variable z, define the demeaned variablez ijt ¼ z it 2 z i 2 z t þ z. Here z i is the mean of z specific to county i across all time periods, z t is the mean of z across all observations at time t, and z is the overall sample mean. The model with a county and time fixed effect can be estimated represented as follows (see, e.g., Conley and Taber 2011):
The identifying assumption behind the consistency of the two-way fixed effects estimator,b FE , is that purging the data of county-specific and common time-specific fixed effects is sufficient for removing confounds, ruling out time-varying heterogeneity with the assumption that EððMW sðiÞt Þ;ẽ ijt Þ ¼ EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ;ẽ it Þ ¼ 0. However, minimum wage policies in the United States tend to exhibit strong geographical clustering, and there are a myriad of factors affecting the low-wage labor market (other than the minimum wage) that vary across US regions. By ignoring such spatial confounds, the two-way fixed effects estimator may be subject to an omitted variables bias. Existing research shows that, indeed, the two-way fixed effects model often attributes to minimum wage policies the effects of regional differences in the growth of low-wage employment that are independent of minimum wage policies. As documentation of this point, figure 4 of Dube et al. (2010) shows that employment levels and trends are negative prior to the minimum wage change using a conventional two-way fixed effects specification.
An alternative and much less restrictive strategy restricts identifying variation to geographically proximate units that are more likely to share common economic shocks. First, for any variable, z ijt , we define the locally-differenced value
Here the object z ijt is the mean of z at time t within the pair p formed by counties i, j.
9 The border discontinuity estimating equation can then be written as follows:
In contrast to the regression in equation (3), the preferred border discontinuity equation (4) consists of a series of localized comparisons within contiguous county pairs, since the differencing in equation (4) washes out all the variation within pairs. Hence, this second strategy uses the within-pair variation across all pairs and effectively pools the estimates. The identifying assumption for the border-discontinuity specification is that, conditional on covariates and county fixed effects, minimum wages are uncorrelated with the residual outcome within a county pair, p: EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ;ẽ it Þ ¼ 0. This assumption can also be written as EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ;ẽ ijt ji; j ∈ pÞ ¼ 0, which clarifies that it is much weaker than the assumption justifying the two-way fixed effects, EðlnMW sðiÞt Þ;ẽ ijt Þ ¼ 0: The consistency ofb FE assumes that lnðMW sðiÞt Þ and e ijt are uncorrelated generally, while the consistency ofb BD only assumes it to hold within neighboring pairs, p, where counties are more likely to face similar shocks.
A simple example of a data-generating process can demonstrate when (4) provides a consistent estimate while (3) does not. For the ease of exposition, in this example we assume all counties are matched exactly once in the sample, so counties i and i 0 are only matched with each other and no other county. Consider an error components model in which e it ¼ u it þ e it ; where e it is a classical disturbance term, with EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ; e it Þ ¼ 0. However, there is also a confounder u it such that EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ; u it Þ 6 ¼ 0: Moreover, it is the case that demeaning the data by time and county is not sufficient to remove the bias from the presence of the u it component, so that EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ;ẽ it Þ ¼ EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ;ũ it Þ 6 ¼ 0. As a result,b FE estimated using equation (3) is inconsistent.
model fails a variety of falsification tests. Allegretto et al. (2013) also show in detail that spatial controls are able to eliminate confounding pre-trends. That paper also shows that the synthetic control estimator is more likely to pick nearby donor states as controls based on matching pre-intervention outcomes and covariates, thereby providing additional evidence to address concerns in Neumark et al. (2013) about the desirability of local or regional controls. 9 Recall that a county i may be part of multiple pairs, and hence in the data set it appears as many times as it is paired with another contiguous cross-border county. For this reason, in general, z ijt 6 ¼ z ij 0 t . Also note that reversing the order of the indices is irrelevant when forming the pair-specific mean, so that z ijt ¼ z jit .
Consider further the case in which the confounder u it is distributed smoothly over space, so that the magnitude of the gap in the confounder between counties i and i 0 becomes vanishingly small as the distance between their centroids shrinks to zero, that is, ju it 2 u i 0 t j → 0 as Dði; i 0 Þ → 0. As the county centroids become arbitrarily close, the locally differenced value of the error component, u, also becomes vanishingly small: ≈ u it → 0, making the covariance with the (locally differenced) treatment vanishingly small as well; that is, EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ;
it is also the case that EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ; ≈ e it Þ → EðlnðMW sðiÞt Þ; ≈ e it Þ ¼ 0. As a result, in the limiting case,b BD estimated using equation (4) is consistent. Simply put, local differencing can remove confounds that are smoothly distributed over space even if these confounds are correlated with minimum wages in an otherwise arbitrary time-varying fashion.
While the de-meaned represenation is useful expositionally, in practice we estimate regression equation (4) by including county and pair-time fixed effects. This approach automatically accounts for unbalanced panels and degrees-of-freedom corrections for estimating group means. Since policy is set at the state level, we cluster our standard errors at the state level as well. Note that the contiguous county pair sample stacks all pairs, so that a particular county will be in the sample as many times as it can be paired with a neighbor across the border. State-level clustering automatically accounts for the presence of county duplicates in the estimation of the standard errors. However, the presence of a single county in multiple pairs along a border segment also may induce a mechanical correlation in the error term across state pairs and potentially along an entire border segment. To account for this induced spatial autocorrelation, we additionally cluster the standard errors on the border segment using multidimensional clustering (Dube et al. 2010; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011) .
Equations (3) and (4) are estimated separately for each outcome y and industry/demographic group (teens, restaurant workers). All coefficients, including fixed effects, are allowed to differ across regressions for each outcome and group, and no cross-equation restriction is imposed.
B. The Quarterly Workforce Indicators Data Set
The recent minimum wage literature in the United States has drawn primarily upon two data sets: the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, or QCEW (e.g., Addison et al. 2009 Addison et al. , 2012 Dube et al. 2010) , and the Current Population Survey, or CPS (e.g., Neumark and Wascher 2007; Allegretto et al. 2011) . The QCEW's advantage lies in providing essentially a full census of employment at the county and industry level, but it provides no information on demographics or job flows. The CPS's advantage lies in providing the worker-level demographic data needed to estimate employment effects by age or gender. However, the CPS's small sample size prevents us from estimating effects within local labor markets. Therefore, neither data source allows researchers to test hypotheses regarding employment flows in response to a minimum wage change at a local labor market level.
In this paper, we use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI), which combines many of the virtues of both the QCEW and the CPS, while also allowing a richer analysis of dynamic responses to minimum wage changes. The QWI data, which are produced through a partnership between the US Census Bureau and the state Labor Market Information (LMI) offices, provide a public use aggregation of the matched employer-employee Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) database. These in turn are compiled from administrative records collected by 49 states and the District of Columbia for both jobs and firms (Massachusetts had not yet entered the program). The operational unit in the QWI is a worker-employer pair. The primary source of information in the microdata is the near-universe of employer-reported Unemployment Insurance (UI) records, covering around 98% of all private-sector jobs. The UI records provide details on employment, earnings, and the place of work and industry. The Census Bureau uses other data-primarily from Social Security records-to either match or impute demographic information of workers. The underlying data sets consequently are much larger than the CPS or JOLTS. While the CPS contains information on separations based on household-reported data, it is much more error prone than the QWI. For detailed documentation of the QWI, see Abowd et al. (2009 Abowd and Vilhuber (2011) provides an extensive comparison of the QWI to the CPS and JOLTS data sets. In Abraham's (2009) assessment of the quality of the QWI data, the only major issue concerns imputed levels of education, which are not 000 Dube et al.
The public use QWI series offers monthly employment counts and average earnings by detailed industry at the county level for specified age and gender groups, as well as quarterly figures for hires, separations, and turnover rates. 12 We use five different dependent variables in our primary empirical analysis: (i) Earnings: average monthly earnings of employees who were on the payroll on the last day of the reference quarter t in county i.
(ii) Employment: number of workers on the payroll on the last day of quarter t in county i.
13 (iii) Accessions (hires): The number of workers who started a new job at any point during quarter t in county i. This variable includes new hires, as well as workers who have been recalled to work. If the individual had worked for the employer sometime during the 4 quarters prior to the accession, the hire is considered a recall; otherwise it is categorized as a new hire.
14 While the minimum length of employment is 1 day, the employment stock measure includes only the full universe of individuals who are on the employer's payroll at the end of the quarter. (iv) Separations: number of workers whose job with a given employer ended in the specified quarter t in county i. A job is defined as ending in quarter t when the worker has no valid wage record with the employer in t þ 1. (5) Turnover rate: average number of hires and separations as a share of total employment: ðAccessions 1 SeparationsÞ/ð2 Â EmploymentÞ. The operational unit is the worker-employer pair-a job. Workers who are employed at more than one employer in a quarter will be included in multiple worker-employer pairs. For this reason, employment, hires, and separation are job-based and not person-based concepts in the QWI.
The first two variables are consistent with the data presented in the QCEW, while the three flow variables-hires, separations, and turnover rate-are unique to the QWI. In addition, the QWI offers separate tabulations of these outcome variables calculated only for workers who were employed at the firm for at least 1 full quarter. 15 We refer to this group of workers as the "full-quarter sample." The QWI also provides additional information on workers moving in or out of jobs. For those workers who were hired in the past quarter or who separated in the past quarter, we know the duration-from 0 to 5 quarters-of their nonemployment spells prior to their being hired or following their separation. Although the QWI does not disaggregate separations to other jobs from separations to nonemployment, the nonemployment duration data are valuable for assessing how minimum wage policy affects EE and EU transitions. Finally, for the full-quarter sample of hires and separations, we also know their full-quarter earnings during quarter t (i.e., prior to separation or subsequent to being hired).
Our paper focuses on labor turnover in response to minimum wage changes within a specific low-wage industry or a specific demographic group. Low-wage labor markets have long been characterized by high turnover, with very short employment spells and frequent shifts between labor market participation and nonparticipation. Consequently, earnings, employment, and turnover calculations may vary considerably with the proportion of workers who begin or complete job spells during the quarter. Thus, we present our empirical estimates for earnings, employment, hires, separations, and turnover for workers at all tenure levels as well the full-quarter sample. Figure 1 shows the number of available states by year. The states were nonrandomly missing: for example, large states 15 More precisely, according to the Census Bureau, the > 1 quarter hires measure equals the number of workers who began work with an employer in the previous quarter and remained with the same employer in the current quarter; the > 1 quarter separations measure equals the number of workers who had a job for at least a full quarter and then the job ended in the current quarter. 16 The QWI does not report hours worked or whether a new hire worked 1 day or almost the entire quarter. However, if employers adjust to minimum wage increases by cutting hours, we would expect to find lower earnings effects. As we show below, we find earnings effects with the QWI that are very similar to those we have found using CPS and Census/ACS data on hourly earnings (Allegretto et al. 2013) , indicating that the limitations of the QWI are unlikely to be important in explaining the findings here. The same reasoning applies to workers who hold multiple jobs and are therefore counted multiple times in the QWI but not in the CPS or Census/ACS. Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer (2012) report that 95% of employer-to-employer flows occur from a main job to a main job, where the main job is defined as the primary source of earnings in that quarter. figure B1 , we show the timing of minimum wage increases in each of the state-border pairs in our sample. We see substantial variation on the 88 policy borders, especially between 2004 and 2009. This period includes the three steps of the 2007-9 federal minimum wage increases and many state-level changes. There are 196 incidents of quarterover-quarter minimum wage increases when we pool across federal and local policy changes. Figure 2 shows that the mean 1-quarter change associated with these minimum wage increases was 0.09 log points and that Figure 3 shows that the gaps between the two sides of the border were substantial-70% of the sample border counties had some minimum wage variation with its contiguous pair. For these counties, the maximum gap in log minimum wages within pairs averaged 0.212 log points, a substantial difference. Limiting our attention to cross-border comparisons still provides us with sizable policy variation that we can use for estimating minimum wage effects.
Demographic Groups and Industries
We estimate minimum wage effects for two broad employee groups, both of which have been the focus of much previous empirical research and both of which include high shares of minimum wage workers. The first employment group consists of teens. Using the demographic information contained in the QWI, we present minimum wage elasticities for FIG. 2.-The figure shows the kernel density estimate of changes in relative minimum wages for the sample border county pairs (with centroids within 75 kilometers) in 2010-11. Specifically, this is the density of the absolute value of the 196 1-quarter changes in the gap in log minimum wage across neighboring counties within a pair, for those periods with changes in the gap. The vertical dashed line denotes the average change in minimum wage of 0.09 log points. 000 Dube et al.
all teens of ages 14-18. 18 Teens are disproportionately likely to be minimum wage workers. Based on the Current Population Survey, during the 2000-2011 period, 29.8% of teens earned within 10% of the minimum wage. And teens comprised 25.2% of all workers earning within 10% of the minimum wage. The second high-impact group consists of establishments in the restaurant industry. During the same period, restaurants employed 24.3% of all workers paid within 10% of the state/federal minimum wage, making restaurants the single-largest employer of minimum wage workers at the three-digit industry level. Restaurants are also the most intensive user of minimum wage workers, with 22.8% of restaurant workers earning within 10% of the minimum wage (using threedigit level industry data). 19 We also provide additional estimates within 18 The youngest age category reported in the QWI is 14 -18. 19 These statistics on restaurants exclude drinking places. The figure shows the kernel density estimate of the maximum gap in log minimum wages, over the sample period, between two neighboring counties in each pair for those counties that had such a gap. The vertical dashed line shows that the average gap in minimum wages was 0.212 log points for these counties.
Minimum Wage Shocks, Employment Flows, and Labor Market Frictions 000 the restaurant sample by age categories (teens, young adults who are 19-24 years old, and all other adults) and gender to test for substitution among these groups.
Contiguous Border County Pair Sample
Our research design is based on contiguous border county pairs. Our QWI sample consists of the 1,130 counties that border another state. Collectively, these border counties comprise 1,181 unique county pairs. Appendix figure C1 shows a map of the border county sample. While most counties in the border pair sample are geographically proximate, counties in the western United States are much larger in size and irregular in shape. In some cases, the geographic centroids of the counties in such pairs lie several hundred kilometers apart. Appendix figure C2 shows the distribution of distances between centroids in the county pair sample, confirming the presence of such counties. Appendix figure C3 nonparametrically plots the mean absolute difference in key covariates between counties in a pair by the distance between the pairs using a local polynomial smoother. The covariates include log of overall private sector employment, log population, employment-topopulation ratio, log of average private sector earnings, overall turnover rate, and the teen share of the population. We show the results for these variables in levels as well as 4-quarter and 12-quarter differences. As expected, in 17 out of 18 cases, the differences increase as we consider counties with more distant centroids. These differences are small for counties within 50 kilometers of each other, but they become sizable when the distances reach 100 kilometers or more.
For this reason, in our primary sample, we exclude counties whose centroids are more than 75 kilometers apart. A smaller distance cutoff trades off lower error variance from greater similarity against higher error variance from a smaller sample. The exact choice of cutoff was based on a data-driven randomization inference procedure that minimized the meansquared error (MSE) of the estimator in the border sample using placebo treatments; appendix B provides more details. When averaged over our five key outcomes, the 75 kilometer cutoff produced the smallest MSE, as shown in appendix figure C4 . 20 This criterion retains about 81% of the sample, eliminating mostly Western counties, as illustrated in figure C1 . To show that our results are not affected by the choice of cutoffs, table B1 reports the key results with cutoffs ranging between 45 and 95 kilometers.
In addition, in any single regression, we limit the sample to counties that have a full panel of disclosed data. The QWI does not report values for cells in which too few establishments comprise the sample and/or where the identity of a given establishment could be inferred. In our primary sample, we exclude counties that ever report a nondisclosed or null quantity for a given outcome (data quality flags 0 or 5). We exclude counties with any nondisclosure data issues because observations for these counties may be selected out of the sample when the minimum wage is high (through reducing employment). Depending on the variable, this exclusion leads to dropping between 1% and 14% of the sample. Additionally, some cell values are substantially distorted from the fuzzing of the data that is undertaken to ensure confidentiality (data quality flag 9). 21 Depending on the variable, up to half of the counties have some instances of distorted data. As a robustness check, we also report below estimates excluding these distorted observations. We merge data on the county's overall and teen population, and the value of each state's minimum wage in each quarter, with the QWI county-pair panel data set.
D. Descriptive Statistics
What are the effects of restricting our sample to border-county pairs? Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for our five outcome variables for all 2,960 US counties and for the 972 contiguous counties in our border-county pair sample whose centroids are no more than 75 kilometers apart. We display these measures for all employed teens and all restaurant workers, separately for workers at all tenure levels and those with at least 1 quarter of tenure. Table 1 also displays summary statistics for movers, whom we examine separately later in the paper.
Depending on the worker group and tenure level, average monthly earnings are 1%-3% lower in the border-county pair sample, while average employment is 2%-3% lower. Hire, separation, and turnover rates, as well as the fraction short-term (employed less than 1 quarter), are 2%-3% lower in the border-county pair sample. Among movers, earnings at the job are slightly lower in the border-county pair sample, while the duration of nonemployment is slightly higher. We surmise that the border-county sample is composed of somewhat smaller counties, but this difference is modest. All the other characteristics of the two samples, including the demographic characteristics shown at the bottom of table 1, are quite close.
In our border-county pair sample, the teen workforce is about evenly divided by gender, with 54% female. In contrast, over 65% of the res-21 See Abowd and Vilhuber (2011) for more details. 22 We treat the county of San Francisco, California, as a separate policy unit and compare it with neighboring counties. San Francisco has a county-level minimum wage that applies to all workers and establishments, analogous to a state minimum wage in every respect.
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This content downloaded from 152.002.230.230 on April 29, 2016 07:16:14 AM taurant workforce is female. Unsurprisingly, the teen and restaurant workforces overlap: 22% of all restaurant workers are teens. Another 15% are young adults under 25. Although not shown in this table, about 35% of all teen workers are employed in restaurants.
In general, we find that quarterly turnover rates for teens are around 60%, while those of restaurant workers are around 40%. These figures indicate high rates of turnover in the low-wage labor market. 23 We also find a high prevalence of short-term jobs and striking indications of how concentrated the separations are in short-term jobs. Among restaurant 23 As discussed in Abowd and Vilhuber (2011) , the QWI turnover rates are consistently higher than those reported in JOLTS because the QWI "captures essentially all of the short-term jobs, while JOLTS apparently misses most of them." NOTE.-Sample means are reported for all counties in the United States and for all contiguous border county pairs with county centroids no greater than 75 kilometers apart. Monthly earnings are in nominal dollars. Hires, separations, and turnover rates are quarterly. Sample sizes vary by demographic group, industry, and tenure, and they range from 114,996 to 146,519 for the all county sample and 59,260 to 89,078 for the contiguous county pair sample. Sample period is from 2000Q1 through 2011Q4. Data source: Quarterly Workforce Indicators. 000 Dube et al.
workers (teens), jobs with less than 1 quarter of tenure account for 25% (30%) of all jobs and 74% (81%) of all separations. 24 This duration dependence of separation is useful when we interpret the results on the the turnover elasticity in Section IV.
E. Similarity of Control Groups
To examine whether local controls are indeed more similar, we consider six key covariates: log of overall private sector employment, log population, private sector employment-to-population ratio (EPOP), log of average private sector earnings, overall turnover rate, and teen share of population. For each covariate, we test for differences in mean absolute values between contiguous counties and other pairs. We note first that none of these variables is likely to be substantially affected by the treatment status. Therefore, a finding that contiguous counties are more alike in these dimensions cannot be attributed to having more similar minimum wages. More specifically, for each of these six covariates, we calculate the mean absolute differences between (i) a county in our border sample and its contiguous cross-state-border pair and (ii) a county in our border sample and every noncontiguous pair outside of the state. For the latter, each of the 972 counties in 966 cross-border pairs is paired with every possible out-of-state county, for a total of 1,737,884 pairings. For each time period, we calculate the absolute differences in levels and changes of these variables between the county and (i) its cross-border pair and (ii) its noncontiguous pair, respectively. Subsequently, we collapse the data set back to the county-pairperiod level and calculate the means of the absolute differences in covariates between counties within pairs. The standard errors are calculated allowing for clustering multidimensionally on each of the two counties in the crossborder pair. Table 2 shows the results for these variables in levels as well as in 4-quarter and 12-quarter changes. In all cases, the mean absolute differences are larger for noncontiguous pairs, and in all cases the gaps are statistically significant at the 1% level. The average percentage gap in absolute differences for the 12 variables is about 19%. The gaps are substantially higher for levels of employment and earnings, for 4-quarter and 12-quarter changes in EPOP, and for 12-quarter changes in the turnover rate. We conclude that cross-border counties do offer an attractive control group that better balances observed covariates-especially as they relate to the state of the labor market. These local controls therefore reduce the scope for bias stemming from omitted confounders. 24 Denoting the less-than-full-quarter employees as group 1 and full-quarter employees as group 2, the less-than-full-quarter share of separations s 1 was calculated as [s 2 (1 2 f 1 )s 2 ]/s, where s is the overall separation rate, s 2 is the separation rate for full-quarter employees and f 1 is the fraction of workers with less-thanfull-quarter tenure. All three of these quantities are reported in NOTE.-Each of the 972 counties in 966 cross-border pairs with centroids within 75 kilometers is merged with every possible out-of-state county, a total of 1,737,884 pairings. Absolute differences in levels and changes are calculated between the county, its border pair, and its randomly assigned pair, respectively. Subsequently, the data set is collapsed back to county-pair-period level and means of the absolute differences in covariates between counties within pairs are calculated, clustering standard errors (in parentheses) multidimensionally on each of the two counties in the cross-border pair. EPOP = employment-to-population ratio. Gap is a test of difference in mean absolute value of the covariate between contiguous and other pairs. Percentage Gap divides this gap value by the mean for the contiguous pairs. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
IV. Empirical Findings
A. Main Results
We present in table 3 our main findings on the effects of minimum wage increases for teens and for restaurant workers. For each group we report estimates for five outcome variables and two specifications, one with controls for common time effects (the conventional model) and the second with controls for county-pair-specific time effects (the preferred model). Both are reported in the table to demonstrate the relevance of our border discontinuity-based research design. The text usually refers to our preferred specification, except when discussing how estimates from the conventional model can be misleading due to the presence of spatial heterogeneity. NOTE.-The table reports coefficients associated with log minimum wage on the log of the dependent variable noted in the first column. All regressions include controls for natural log of county population and total private sector employment. Specifications 1 and 2 provide estimates for all teens ages 14 -18 regardless of industry, and they also include log of teen population. Specifications 3 and 4 are limited to all workers in the restaurant industry (NAICS722). All samples and specifications include county fixed effects. Specifications 1 and 3 include common time period fixed effects. For specifications 2 and 4, period fixed effects are interacted with each county pair. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state and border-segment levels for all regressions. Sample sizes are reported as well for each regression in squared brackets. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
We begin by showing that the minimum wage is binding for each of these groups. The estimated effects on log average monthly earnings are positive and highly significant-for both specifications and for both groups of workers. For each group of workers, the conventional specification (cols. 1 and 3) yields similar measured effects on earnings as our preferred border discontinuity specification (cols. 2 and 4). The elasticity of earnings in our preferred specification is 0.222 among all teen workers and 0.207 among all restaurant workers. 25 These findings put to rest any concerns that restricting the identifying variation to cross-border pairs leads to a lack of actual earnings differentials between the treated and control units.
We turn next to the estimated employment effects, shown in the second row of table 3. We highlight two results in this row. First, the conventional specification (col. 1) yields an estimated employment elasticity of 20.173 for teen workers. But when we account for spatial heterogeneity using the border discontinuity specification (col. 2), the coefficient is small in magnitude (20.059), and it is not significantly different from zero. 26 In other words, we find strong evidence that spatial heterogeneity produces a spurious disemployment effect for teen workers, and we demonstrate the magnitude of the disemployment bias among studies using the conventional specification. Second, we replicate the qualitative findings in Dube et al. (2010) using the QWI sample: among all restaurant workers the conventional estimate of the employment elasticity is 20.073 and statistically significant. But accounting for spatial heterogeneity reduces the effect (in magnitude) to 20.022 and renders it indistinguishable from zero.
Finally, we consider the estimates for the flow outcomes-log hires, log separations, and log of the turnover rate. The findings here contrast sharply with those on employment levels. As rows 3-5 of table 3 indicate, hires, separations, and the turnover rate fall substantially and significantly with minimum wage increases. For our preferred specification (cols. 2 and 4), the separations elasticity is substantial both for teens (20.233) and for restaurant workers (20.225). The accessions (hires) elasticities are quite similar to the separations elasticities, which is consistent with the responses reflecting steady state to steady state comparisons. 27 For each group, the estimated effects for separations and hires are smaller using the preferred specification as compared to the conventional one. In part, this result is to 25 The elasticities for teens and for restaurant workers are very close to our estimates for these groups using the CPS for teens (Allegretto et al. 2011 ) and the QCEW for restaurants (Dube et al. 2010) . 26 The conventional estimates on teens are very close to those found by researchers using the CPS and similar models (Allegretto et al. 2011) . 27 As we mentioned in the data section, the elasticities for new hires are nearly identical to those for all hires, and new hires account for virtually all of the reduction in hires documented in this paper (results not shown).
be expected because the downward bias in employment estimates in the conventional specification mechanically imparts an analogous bias to the separations and hires elasticities but not to the turnover rate elasticity or any other rate elasticities. (The separation rate elasticity is equal to the separations elasticity less the employment elasticity.) However, we also note that the turnover rate reductions were nearly twice as large in the conventional specifications.
Summarizing to this point, our border discontinuity estimates find strong positive responses of earnings to a minimum wage increase. This rise in earnings is met with a small change in the employment stock that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, we find clear evidence that employment flows (hires and separations) fall strongly in response to the policy change. And these patterns hold whether we consider a highimpact demographic group (teens) or a high-impact industry (restaurants).
To illustrate the importance of our estimated elasticities for the affected groups, we consider a hypothetical increase in the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $9.50 (a 31% increase). This increase is similar in percentage terms to others in our data set, and the higher minimum wage level falls within the range of our data. This minimum wage increase would reduce turnover by 6.3% among teens and 6.6% among restaurant workers. At the mean turnover rates listed in table 2, average turnover for the countypair sample would fall from 58.9% to 52.6% among teens and from 41.2% to 34.6% for restaurant workers. Similarly, based on the point estimates for employment (although not significant), the same hypothetical minimum wage increase would result in a small reduction in employment among teens and in the restaurant sector (2.3% and 0.9%, respectively). Since county employment levels average 1,194 for teens and 2,847 in restaurants, this minimum wage increase would result in about 27.7 fewer teens employed and 24.6 fewer restaurant jobs in the average county. Table 4 presents three robustness checks for our main results, using our preferred specification with pair-specific time effects and estimated for teens and for restaurant workers.
B. Robustness Checks
One potential concern is that the flow results for teens and restaurant workers may be affected by unobserved overall county labor market trends. As a check on our identification strategy, columns 1 and 5 include countyspecific linear trends. The results are largely similar to our preferred specification in table 3. As an added check, columns labeled 2 and 6 include the overall private sector-level outcome (earnings, separation, turnover, etc.) as an additional control. (Note that all regressions in the paper include log of overall private sector employment as a regressor.) Unlike employment, a disproportionately large share of overall separations and new hires come from the low-wage sector. For this reason, including the overall private sector flow measure constitutes a particularly tough test. For teens, adding these controls slightly reduces the magnitude of the flow coefficients, while for restaurant workers including these controls does not alter the size of the coefficients. In all cases, the flow coefficients retain statistical significance at the conventional levels. Overall, we conclude that the reductions in flows in low-wage sectors and demographic groups are not driven primarily by unobserved local trends in flows.
As described in the data section, in some cases the fuzzing of the QWI data for confidentiality reasons might produce substantial distortions in the data, where the (unreported) true and the (reported) fuzzed value for a given variable differ substantially. 28 As a further check, columns 3 and 7 show the results using only the observations that are not substantially distorted. This exclusion reduces the sample size by less than 3% among teens and between 6% and 11% among restaurant workers (depending upon the variables). Comparing these results with the baseline results in columns 2 and 4 in table 3, we find the results to be virtually identical: we find sizable earnings effects, small employment effects, and much larger reductions in employment flows.
Super columns 4 and 8 in table 4 report results from a test for the presence of preexisting trends that might confound the estimates, as well as for possible lagged effects. We estimate a single specification that includes both a 1-year (4 quarters) lead lnðMW t þ 4 Þ and a 1-year (4 quarters) lag lnðMW t 2 4 Þ, in addition to the contemporaneous minimum wage lnðMW t Þ.
29 All three of the coefficients are reported in the table. Across all our outcomes, we do not find any statistically significant leading or lagged effects, which are all less than 0.1 in magnitude. Moreover, including the leading and lagged minimum wage terms does not attenuate our statistically significant contemporary coefficients for the earnings and flow measures reported in table 3. These results provide additional internal validity to our research design and rule out the possibility that the large reductions in the flows are driven by preexisting trends. In the same vein, we do not detect any anticipation effects in the earnings or flow measures. Nor is there evidence of substantial lagged effects-the rise in earnings and the reductions in employment flows occur immediately-within three-quarters of the minimum wage increase. These results also show that the reduction in flows represents a permanent change in response to the policy; they are not transitional dynamics. The latter observation justifies our assumption that these elasticities reflect changes from one steady state to another, which becomes important when we use these elasticities in appendix A to perform steady state-based decomposition and calibration exercises. As we mentioned in our discussion of the descriptive statistics, turnover generally is concentrated among short-term jobs-those of 1 quarter or less. Existing evidence shows that separation probability declines with tenure, which can result either from learning by doing (match-specific human capital) or from learning about match quality. At the same time, if minimum wage workers are concentrated in lower-tenure categories, there may appear to be a duration-specific effect that in reality reflects worker heterogeneity.
If minimum wage increases reduce labor market flows, we would expect to find that they also reduce the fraction of workers with such short-term jobs. Columns 1 and 4 of table 5 provide estimated effects on the fraction of short-term jobs for teens and restaurant workers, respectively. The estimated effect is negative for both groups, although it is (marginally) statistically significant only for the restaurant sample. By dividing the coefficients by the share of less-than-full-quarter employment (from table 1), we obtain elasticities of 20.08 for teens and 20.11 for restaurants.
To investigate further how minimum wage effects vary by tenure, we estimate our preferred specification for workers who have at least 1 quarter of job tenure.
31 Table 5 displays our previously displayed results for workers at all tenure levels (col. 1 for teens and col. 4 for restaurant workers), as well as for those who have at least 1 quarter of tenure (cols. 2 and 5). Since the QWI does not report outcomes for those with less than a full quarter of tenure, we have backed these values out using "all" and "full-quarter" outcomes. (This procedure is somewhat problematic, however, for earnings. Average earnings for workers with less-than-full-quarter tenure is affected both by actual earnings per unit of time and the extent of time employed during the quarter.)
When we limit attention to workers with at least 1 quarter of job tenure, the earnings estimates for both teens and restaurant workers are somewhat smaller than among workers of all tenure levels. But they continue to be statistically significant. For the teen sample, the standard errors are much larger in this sample and rule out meaningful comparison. The earnings effects for less-than-full-quarter employment, although noisier, are larger than for full-quarter employees in the restaurant sample. 30 As in Dube et al. (2010) , when we compare outcomes in border versus interior counties to detect cross-border spillovers, we do not find such spillovers (results not shown). 31 The QWI data do not provide breakdowns for tenure longer than 1 quarter.
Given the imprecision with the less-than-full-quarter earnings sample, we also perform an alternative calculation for the less-than-full-quarter earnings elasticity. We back out this estimate by using the overall and fullquarter earnings elasticities, the full-quarter share elasticity, and average earnings for full-quarter and all jobs. These imply less-than-full-quarter earnings elasticities of 0.32 and 0.47 for teens and restaurant workers, NOTE.-The table reports coefficients associated with log minimum wage on the log of the dependent variable noted in the first column, except for "Fraction with Tenure < 1 Quarter" where the outcome is not in logs. All regressions include controls for natural log of county population and total private sector employment. Specifications 1-3 provide estimates for all teens ages 14-18 regardless of industry, and they also include log of teen population. Specifications 4-6 are limited to all workers in the restaurant industry (NAICS722). All samples and specifications include county fixed effects and pair-specific time effects. Specifications 2 and 5 limit the sample to "full quarter" employees with 1 or more quarter of tenure; specifications 3 and 6 limit samples to employees with less than full quarter tenure. The alternative calculations for the less than full quarter earnings elasticity use the overall and full quarter earnings elasticities, less than full quarter share elasticity, and sample means of full quarter share and earnings differences by tenure, as explained in the text. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state and border segment levels for all regressions. Sample sizes are reported as well for each regression in squared brackets. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
respectively. 32 The restaurant estimates are quite similar in both casesshowing much larger earnings effects for less-than-full-quarter employees. For teens, given the imprecision of the original estimates, we put more stock in the alternative calculation, which also shows much higher earnings effects at lower tenure levels. A final piece of evidence is provided below in table D1 (and discussed in greater detail in appendix D), where we consider the sample of full-quarter hires-workers with tenure between 1 and 2 quarters. In that sample, we find earnings elasticities of 0.29 (0.30) for teens (restaurant workers), which also exceed the full-quarter earnings elasticities of 0.19 (0.15) for teens (restaurant workers). Overall, the evidence shows that earnings increase relatively more for low-tenured workers, but we see substantial earnings increase among higher-tenured workers as well.
Employment effects for the full-quarter tenure sample are very small in magnitude but more negative than for less-than-full-quarter employees, as expected given the reduction in their share. Among full-quarter employees, the estimated effects on hires and separations are smaller than among workers of all tenure levels, and they are no longer significant. In contrast, the separations, hires, and turnover rate elasticities for less-than-full-quarter employees are statistically significant and sizable and much larger than for full-quarter employees. 33 These findings suggest that minimum wage changes reduce turnover more sharply for workers with a lower tenure level, a group whose earnings also grow more. However, since earnings rise substantially for fullquarter employees, it seems unlikely that a compositional change can explain the differential impact by tenure level. Rather, some form of duration dependence is a likely part of the explanation, an interpretation that is consistent with the decline in the separation rate with greater tenure as shown in the descriptive statistics (table 1) . Duration dependence could reflect learning about match quality early in a worker's tenure-the channel highlighted by Brochu and Green. However, a job ladder model extended to include learning by doing can also rationalize why separations would fall over time. As shown in Nagypal (2007) , a growth in the value of the match over time-for example, from job-specific learning by doingalso generates a fall-off in the EE transitions in an extended job ladder model. Moreover, Nagypal (2007) finds that learning by doing tends to be the dominant factor at very short tenure, while learning about match quality is more important subsequently. Therefore, while we view our results as consistent with an explanation involving either some learning about match quality or some learning by doing, it is difficult to separate the two or to identify whether this effect occurs through quits or layoffs.
D. Results by Time Period
As we mentioned in the introduction, our main results focus on the 2000-2011 time period, when most states are in the data set. In this section, we check our main results using two extended QWI samples, one that begins in 1990 and another that begins in 1994. Table 6 shows these results, displayed for teens in columns 1 and 3 and for restaurant workers in columns 5 and 7. The results for the full QWI sample and for the 1994-2001 time period in table 6 are qualitatively similar to our main results in table 3. The earnings effects are slightly larger in table 6 for both groups; the employment effect for teens is slightly larger in magnitude, while that for restaurant workers is nearly the same. The flow estimates are very similar to those in table 3.
To distinguish between samples by years and the effects of distorted data, table 6 shows our results when we also exclude distorted observations. These results are displayed in columns 2 and 4 for teens and in columns 6 and 8 for restaurant workers. The qualitative results remain the same as before; they are, if anything, more precisely determined: minimum wage increase average earnings, they do not have a substantial or statistically significant effect on employment, and they have clear negative effects on employment flows. Moreover, the differences between estimates across time periods are very small when we limit attention to the undistorted sample. 34 34 Although not displayed, we also investigated whether excluding recessionary periods from the sample would affect the results. This exclusion made no material difference to our estimates-whether to the baseline sample in An important question in the minimum wage literature concerns whether higher minimum wages induce employers to substitute away from some demographic groups. Previous researchers, such as Neumark and Wascher (2007) , find disemployment effects and also report substitution away from some groups of teens. Although we do not find substantial disemployment effects, substitution effects might still be present, affecting the shares of different groups in particular jobs, thereby affecting employment prospects of various low-skill workers.
To address this question directly, we report in table 7 estimates of the impact of minimum wage increases on outcomes for the demographic groups in our key industry-restaurants. The first column reports the employment share of each of the demographic groups in the restaurant workforce. The second and third columns report the impact of a log point change in the minimum wage on log average earnings (col. 2) and share of employment (col. 3). Teen and young adult workers in restaurants obtain (under 20.11 in magnitude) and are never statistically significant. In sum, we do not find evidence suggesting substantial labor-labor substitution among the age and gender categories in our data. More generally, if minimum wage increases lead to a sizable reallocation of workers, one would expect differences in short-term and longterm responses in separations and hires-as additional gross flows accommodate reallocation in the short run. As we saw in table 4, the data suggest the opposite: both separations and accessions fall immediately, and the short-run and long-run changes are quite similar. The lack of substitution away from teens or young adults in response to a rise in their relative earnings is similar to Giuliano (2013) , who studies the impact of minimum wages using payroll data from a retail chain. 35 This lack of substantial labor-labor substitution sharpens the anomaly for the competitive labor market model's explanation of minimum wage effects, and it hence provides an additional reason to consider models with search frictions.
F. Nonemployment Duration of Movers
In addition to possibly affecting earnings, employment, and separation rates, minimum wages may also affect how long workers spend between jobs. If the reduction in separations from a minimum wage increase reflects a lower job-finding probability in the labor market for the employed and the nonemployed alike, the minimum wage increase would raise the length of spells between jobs. Estimating the effect of minimum wages on the duration of jobless spells between jobs can therefore provide additional evidence of the impact of the policy on the tightness of the lowwage labor market.
The QWI data report the average number of quarters (up to a maximum of 4) spent by each separating worker without a job subsequent to leaving the current job. Ideally, we would estimate separately the impact of minimum wages on the nonemployment duration of EN separations and the incidence of EE transitions. (By definition, the EE transitions have a nonemployment duration of zero.) Unfortunately, the QWI data only report the mean duration of nonemployment for all separations (i.e., EE 35 Giuliano does find a greater and positive labor supply response for teens than for adults, leading to an increase in the teen share of employment. 36 Although not shown in the table, the conventional specification does spuriously suggest substitution away from teens and males and toward older workers and females. These results suggest the importance of controls for spatial heterogeneity when testing for substitution effects, just as in the case for employment overall.
and EN separations together). However, the effect on mean nonemployment duration is still informative. If a minimum wage increase leads to a greater difficulty in finding jobs in general through a lower offer arrival rate to workers and the nonemployed alike, it would also raise the mean nonemployment duration both through longer spells between jobs, and fewer job-to-job transitions. Indeed, longer spells between jobs and fewer job-tojob transtions both occur during economic downturns (e.g., Shimer 2005 Shimer , 2012 .
Appendix table D1 reports minimum wage effects on nonemployment duration for teen movers as well as for those moving in and out of restaurant jobs. (The nonemployment duration measures and the results are discussed in greater detail in appendix C.) Overall, we find little impact of minimum wages on the length of spells between jobs. Based on the point estimates, a 10% minimum wage increase changes the mean duration of nonemployment by no more than 0.3% in magnitude for both separations and hires-and for both teens and restaurant workers. While our results in previous sections show that fewer workers move in and out of jobs when the minimum wage rises, those who are moving do not appear to spend a longer time between jobs.
We note that the stable mean nonemployment duration following all separations, D, is consistent with reductions in both EE and EN transitions, which leave the share f EE the same, coupled with a stable duration of nonemployment for those transitioning out of work, D EN . However, since the QWI does not distinguish between EE and EN separations, the lack of an impact on the overall duration of nonemployment could mask a combination of (i) a shift in the job-to-job (EE) share of separations along with (ii) a change in the nonemployment duration of those separating from employment to nonemployment (EN). What our findings do rule out is the possibility of reduced job-finding probabilities for the employed and the nonemployed alike, which would have unambiguously raised the average nonemployment duration, D.
V. Discussion
We provide minimum wage elasticities of earnings, employment stocks, and employment flows for teens as well as for a high-impact industryrestaurants. We do so using a border discontinuity design that accounts for the kind of spatial heterogeneity that has been shown to be important in the literature. The results on employment flows constitute the first evidence on this topic using representative data from the United States. Our border discontinuity design shows that even though teen and restaurant employment stocks are not substantially reduced in response to a minimum wage increase, employment flows fall substantially. Average separations, hires, and turnover rates decline significantly among teen workers and restaurant establishments. These changes occur within three-quarters of the minimum wage increase, and they persist. We do not find an impact on the duration of nonemployment for those leaving or joining jobs. Our data also permit us to test directly whether the absence of an employment effect in the restaurant sector simply reflects the substitution of older workers for teens or males for females. We do not detect evidence of substantial labor-labor substitution in restaurants in response to minimum wage increases with respect to age and gender.
We consider alternative explanations for our findings by using two different models of endogenous separations. In particular, we show that the relative magnitudes of the employment and separation rate elasticities are qualitatively similar to what one would expect from calibrating a model with on-the-job search. At the same time, an alternative explanation based on match quality learning suggests that layoffs and hence transitions to unemployment may also be an important margin. Both the job ladder and the match quality models can explain the combination of a small employment effect combined with a larger effect on separationsbut through different types of transitions. Our analysis of the matched sample of teens (restaurant workers) using the 2000-2011 Current Population Surveys shows that separations to other jobs constituted 53% (59%) of EU + EE separations (see appendix table A1). Nagypal (2008) also shows that a majority of separations to other jobs or unemployment were to other jobs. Unfortunately, the QWI data set does not separately report job-to-job transitions versus transitions to nonemployment, making it impossible to direclty measure the importance of these two channels. However, as shown in appendix A (available online), the consistency between the predictions of the job ladder model calibrated using crosssectional flows and the empirical findings on the relative magnitudes of the employment and separations elasticities provide evidence consistent with the EE channel. At the same time, the duration dependence in the reduction in separations is consistent with the job being an experience good, as suggested by the the match quality model. Finally, the fact that mean nonemployment duration following all separations is unaffected by the policy is consistent with a reduction in both types of separations. The Census Bureau plans to make job-to-job flows available as part of the QWI program, which should help researchers better distinguish these channels.
Overall, these results emphasize the importance of looking beyond employment rates to understand the impacts of minimum wages. Minimum wage increases over the past decade appear to have substantially reduced turnover and increased job stability, with small effects on overall employment levels for highly affected groups, such as teens.
However, important questions remain unanswered. First, we need better data to more directly estimate the impact of minimum wages on separations to other jobs as opposed to nonemployment. Microdata from the LEHD can be very helpful for this exercise. Second, future research should try to determine how reductions in job-to-job transitions affect the earnings profiles of low-skilled and young workers. Is the primary effect of a minimum wage increase to reduce the variability in earnings growth by reducing frictional wage dispersion through raising pay at the bottom? Or does it lead to reduced overall earnings growth over time as workers stay longer at lower wage positions? Relatedly, what happens to pay growth within the firm? This issue is especially relevant given possible changes to firms' incentives to train workers in a low-turnover environment. Do other factors, such as replacement costs and more intensive screening of hires, also play a role? And finally, is most of the reduction in turnover occuring within existing firms, or does it stem instead from a reallocation of workers across very different types of firms? Answers to these questions are important for fully understanding the mechanisms and the welfare implications of the findings in this paper.
